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ALASKA'S PUBLIC DUTY EXCEPTION:
RESTRAINTS UPON THE RIGHT TO
CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Many of Alaska's businesses and industries participate in activi-
ties which involve considerable risk of harm to persons and property.
Not surprisingly, therefore, many parties contractually seek to insulate
themselves from liability arising from their negligence by requiring
that the injured party or a third party bear the costs of injuries result-
ing from these activities. Although Alaska courts have enforced some
of these "hold harmless" agreements, such enforcement tends to dis-
courage the protected party from exercising an appropriate degree of
care. In situations involving the public, this lack of diligence may
have catastrophic results. Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme Court
has recognized an exception to the enforcement of these agreements
when the subject matter of the contract at issue involves a duty to the
public. Lawyers and laypersons must comprehend the extent of this
public duty exception if they are to make appropriate provisions for
the costs of negligent acts and omissions.
Two types of "hold harmless" agreements exist: exculpatory
clauses and indemnity provisions. The distinction between these types
of agreements turns not on the wording of the clause, but rather on its
operation in a particular factual situation. With an exculpatory
clause, one party seeks to prevent the other party to the contract from
recovering against him. An exculpatory clause bars the potential
causes of action that an injured party may have against the party
whose negligence caused the injury.
With an indemnity provision, one party attempts to have the
other party bear the cost of any damages suffered as a result of the first
party's negligence. Indemnity situations typically involve three par-
ties: the injured party, the party who caused the injury and seeks in-
demnity, and the party obligated to indemnify, or pay the injured
party's damages. In this situation, the provision does not bar the in-
jured party from recovering, but merely shifts the burden of paying for
the injury to another party. An indemnity agreement may, however,
function as an exculpatory clause when the injured party and the in-
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demnitor are the same party. In this "two-party" situation, enforce-
ment of the provision precludes the injured party from recovering.
The Alaska Supreme Court's most significant statement on the
public duty exception, Kuhn v. State, I shed light on the extent of the
exception, but many issues demand further resolution. Does the ex-
ception apply in both indemnity and exculpatory situations, or, as in
several states, only in the latter situation? What specific factors should
courts consider in determining the existence of a public duty? Should
a court balance these factors when they conflict? Finally, in which
factual situations does the exception apply?
In examining these issues, this note will analyze the development
of the public duty exception in Alaska. The note will explore the
Kuhn decision and its impact upon the state's ability to protect itself
contractually from liability arising from services provided to the pub-
lic. Finally, refinements in the Alaska approach designed to increase
predictability for practitioners will be suggested, drawing primarily
from California law.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC DUTY EXCEPTION IN ALASKA
Kuhn is one of several cases in which the Alaska Supreme Court
has applied the public duty exception to indemnity clauses. 2 The first
Alaska Supreme Court case to apply the exception was Manson-Os-
berg Co. v. State.3 That case, however, drew heavily from cases de-
cided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4
To provide an understanding of the background of the public duty
exception in Alaska, this section first examines the two Ninth Circuit
opinions which applied the exception prior to any statement by the
Alaska Supreme Court on the subject.
A. The Ninth Circuit Cases: Discovering the Alaska Public Duty
Exception
1. Air Transport Associates, Inc. v. United States. The first Ninth
Circuit case to apply Alaska law on the subject of the public duty
exception was Air Transport Associates, Inc. v. United States. 5 Air
1. 692 P.2d 261 (Alaska 1984).
2. The Alaska Supreme Court's most recent application of the public duty ex-
ception is Rogers & Babler, Div. of Mapco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 713 P.2d 795 (Alaska
1986), discussed infra at notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
3. 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976).
4. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Air Transp. Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 221
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955). Manson-Osberg relied heavily upon Northwest Airlines,
which relied upon Air Transport.
5. 221 F.2d 467.
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Transport involved a contract by which the United States leased to the
plaintiff, an air transportation company, the use of an airfield that the
United States operated in Anchorage.6 The controversy developed
when one of Air Transport's planes struck a government-owned truck,
which was stalled on the runway. When Air Transport sued the
United States to recover for the damages to its plane, the government
defended on the basis of an indemnity provision in the contract. The
indemnity clause provided that Air Transport would "forever release
and discharge the United States, its agencies, agents" from all liability
arising out of any "act, omission, negligence.., or any cause whatso-
ever" in connection with Air Transport's use of the airfield. 7
Air Transport involved questions of both Washington and Alaska
law because the contract was executed in Washington, but performed
in Alaska.8 The Ninth Circuit found that under both Washington and
Alaska law the operation of this passenger airport was a public enter-
prise.9 In considering the validity of the release, the court acknowl-
edged that Washington had accepted the version of the public duty
exception expressed in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS,
which states:
A bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of a
wilful breach of duty is illegal, and a bargain for exemption from
liability for the consequences of negligence is illegal if... (b) one of
the parties is charged with a duty of public service, and the bargain
relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty to
the public, for which it has received or been promised
compensation. 10
Because the contract clearly sought to limit liability for the negli-
gence of the operator of the airfield, and the airfield was a public enter-
prise, the clause was invalid under Washington law as reflected in the
Restatement formulation. 1 Recognizing that Alaska had adopted the
common law and that the Washington approach was consistent with
6. Id. at 469.
7. Id. at 469 n.1.
The clause involved in this case was an exculpatory clause or a "release" instead
of an indemnity clause. However, this does not make a significant difference in the
Alaska Supreme Court's analysis of these issues. This case is cited as authority in
later cases which involve provisions labeled "indemnity" clauses. See, e.g., Northwest
Airlines, 351 F.2d at 256; Kuhn v. State, 692 P.2d 261, 264 (Alaska 1984).
8. Air Transport, 221 F.2d at 471-72.
9. Id. at 472-73.
10. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 575(1) (1932)).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(l)(b) preserves this require-
ment that the service be one for which compensation is paid. But see Tunkl v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 103, 383 P.2d 441, 448, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40 (1963)
(reasoning that there should be no distinction between cases where compensation is
paid or promised and cases involving no compensation).
11. Air Transport, 221 F.2d at 472.
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the common law, the court believed that the same result would be
reached under Alaska law. 12
2. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. The second
Ninth Circuit case to address the public duty exception under Alaska
law was Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. 13 Northwest
Airlines, under a lease agreement with the United States, agreed to
hold Shemya Airport open for public use. 14 Northwest then con-
tracted to allow Alaska Airlines to use the airfield. Under the terms of
the contract, Alaska Airlines agreed to indemnify Northwest for
claims against Northwest arising out of the services provided to
Alaska Airlines under the lease.15
After an accident involving one of its planes, Alaska Airlines sued
Northwest for the resulting damages, alleging that the accident was
solely the result of Northwest's negligence. 16 Northwest instituted a
separate action seeking a declaratory judgment that the indemnity
provision in the contract barred Alaska Airlines's action.17 The Ninth
Circuit held that the indemnity provision was unenforceable because
the subject matter of the contract was a public facility, and thus the
provision was against the policy interests of the general public. 18 The
court also noted, but did not base its opinion on, the fact that there
was an inequality of bargaining power between the contracting parties.
Northwest controlled the only airport in the region; therefore, it was
12. Id. at 472-73.
13. 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965).
14. Id. at 254-55.
15. Id. at 255. The indemnity clause provided that:
Alaska agrees to hold harmless and indemnify Northwest, its officers, agents,
contractors, servants and employees from all claims and liabilities for dam-
ages to, loss of, or destruction of any property of Alaska, its officers,
agents... and the property of any other person or persons which may now
or hereafter arise out of or be in any way connected with the service and
facilities furnished to Alaska under this agreement.
16. Id. Six other suits were brought against Northwest for damages from the
deaths of Alaska Airlines crew members.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 256-57.
The provision in controversy in Northwest Airlines required Alaska Airlines to
"hold harmless and indemnify Northwest." Id. at 255 (emphasis added). Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit used as controlling authority its decision in Air Transport, which
concerned an exculpatory clause. See supra note 7. Once again, enforcing the indem-
nity provision would have not only released the indemnitee from financial responsibil-
ity, but it also would have barred the injured plaintiff from recovering. In fact, in
Northwest Airlines, the two words, "indemnity" and "exculpation" are used almost
interchangeably. For example, at the end of its opinion, the court stated: "We hold
only that the exculpatory and indemnity provision, insofar as it is sought to be en-
forced to spare 'Northwest' from liability for its own negligence, being against public
policy and invalid, is unenforceable." 351 F.2d at 258.
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in a position to force the inclusion of the indemnity provision upon
Alaska Airlines. 19
B. Alaska Supreme Court Decisions on the Public Duty Exception
1. Manson-Osberg Co. v. State. Eleven years after the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Northwest Airlines, the Alaska Supreme Court de-
cided Manson-Osberg v. State,2 0 its first case involving the public duty
exception. Manson-Osberg, the contractor on a bridge-building pro-
ject, had agreed to indemnify the state for any liability related to the
state's negligence in safeguarding the project. Due to Manson-Os-
berg's failure to provide sufficient safety devices and training to its em-
ployees, a Manson-Osberg employee fell from the bridge and was
killed.2' The employee's estate sued the state for failure to exercise
proper care in supervising the contractor.22
The state brought a third-party claim against Manson-Osberg to
recover under the indemnity clause. This clause required that "[t]he
contractor.., hold harmless the government and all of its representa-
tives from all suits, actions, or claims of any character brought on
account of any injuries or damages sustained by any person or prop-
erty in consequence of any neglect in safeguarding the work."' 23 The
trial court found the state liable for the employee's death, but because
of the indemnity clause, held Manson-Osberg responsible for the
judgment.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the trial court's
finding that the state had breached its duty to "safeguard the work and
to exercise reasonable care to compel Manson-Osberg to carry out its
contractual responsibilities." '24 The court then held that the indemnity
clause covered the state's liability, and that, accordingly, Manson-Os-
berg had to indemnify the state for the amount that the decedent's
estate had recovered from the state.25
The court embraced the view that a party may enforce an indem-
19. Id. at 257 n.2 (citing Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955));
see Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962).
20. 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976).
21. Id. at 655 n.1.
22. Id. at 657 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965)).
That section of the Restatement states that:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the
control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to
others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care,
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
23. Manson-Osberg, 552 P.2d at 657.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 659-60.
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nity clause against its own negligence,26 but noted that courts will not
enforce indemnity clauses which "[tend] to promote breach of a duty
owing to thepublic at large."27 The court found no breach of a public
duty and, therefore, no public policy objection to enforcing the indem-
nity agreement against Manson-Osberg. 28 The court, however, did not
suggest what kinds of activities do involve a duty to the "public at
large." 2
9
Two further points of Manson-Osberg bear emphasis. First, apart
from its holding that it will not enforce an indemnity provision when
the provision tends to promote the breach of a duty owed to the pub-
lic, the court cited a footnote from Northwest Airlines which referred
to the importance of considering the relative bargaining power of the
parties in applying the exception. 30 Second, Manson-Osberg involved
three parties-the injured party, the negligent party (the state), and
the indemnifying party (Manson-Osberg). The Alaska Supreme Court
was concerned solely with the relationship between the indemnitee
and the indemnitor, not with the injured party.31 The injured party
would recover regardless of the outcome of the appeal. In Manson-
Osberg, the clause functioned as a true indemnity clause, not as an
exculpatory clause where the injured party would be forced to absorb
a loss due to someone else's negligence. In contrast, in the Ninth Cir-
cuit cases, Northwest Airlines and Air Transport, the negligent parties
founded their defenses on indemnity clauses that, if enforced, would
have functioned as exculpatory clauses.
This pattern of decisions reveals that the court might emphasize
the ability of the injured party to recover his damages. The court may
treat the "two-party" indemnity situation, where enforcing the clause
eliminates recovery by the injured party, differently from the "three-
party" action in which the injured person is not a party to the indem-
nity clause and recovers from the negligent party whether or not the
court enforces the clause between the indemnitee and the indemnitor.
2. Post-Manson-Osberg Refinement of the Public Duty Exception.
The distinction between three-party and two-party indemnity cases
26. Id. at 659.
27. Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added) (citing Northwest Airlines, 351 F.2d 253; Air
Transport, 221 F.2d 467; and Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 95 Colo.
99, 33 P.2d 974 (1934)).
28. Manson-Osberg, 552 P.2d at 660.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Northwest Airlines, 351 F.2d at 257 n.2).
31. In a later opinion, Rogers & Babler v. State, 713 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1986), the
Alaska Supreme Court confirmed this approach of concentrating solely on the rela-
tionship between the parties to the contract. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying
text.
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was indirectly addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Amoco Pro-
duction Co. v. W C. Church Welding & Contracting, Inc.32 In that
case, a Church Welding employee was injured while working on an
off-shore drilling platform and sued Amoco, the owner of the plat-
form. Church Welding had agreed to indemnify Amoco for injuries to
Church's employees occurring as a result of the two parties' operations
under their agreement. 33 On the basis of this provision, Amoco filed a
third-party claim to force Church Welding to bear the costs of the
employee's injuries.
The supreme court held that, absent a showing of unconscionabil-
ity or unequal bargaining power, the indemnity clause was enforcea-
ble.34 The Amoco court did not directly address the public duty
exception, because the contract did not involve any duties affecting the
public.35 The importance of Amoco lies in the court's emphasis on
Amoco's ability to secure liability insurance against the claim.36 Un-
like exculpatory clauses, which preclude the injured party from recov-
ering, indemnity provisions in the "three-party" situation function
much like liability insurance. By acknowledging this fact, the court
may have implicitly distinguished between the two types of clauses
and supplied a basis for the argument that the public duty exception
can be applied differently in the two situations.
In Burgess Construction Co. v. State,37 the supreme court shed
additional light on the parameters of the public duty exception. Bur-
gess involved a suit by the state to recover on an indemnity clause in a
contract with Burgess for the construction of a section of road.38
While doing work related to the contract, two of Burgess's employees
were killed. The accident resulted from the negligence of the state and
one of the deceased employees. 39 Having agreed to indemnify the
state for damages resulting from the state's negligence, Burgess argued
that the public duty exception prevented enforcement of the indemnity
clause. In response, the court articulated the two principles underly-
ing the Alaska version of the public duty exception:
The first is that those to whom the exception applies should guard
against the consequences of their negligence at all times; indemnity
32. 580 P.2d 697 (Alaska 1978).
33. Id. at 698. The contract provided that Church Welding would indemnify
Amoco for injuries to Church Welding employees "arising out of this contract and
whether or not such losses, costs, expenses and causes of action are occasioned by or
incidental to or the result of the negligence of [Amoco]."Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 698 n.2. The court found that the contract did "not involve any ques-
tion of a duty to the public at large."
36. Id. at 698.
37. 614 P.2d 1380 (Alaska 1980).
38. Id. at 1381.
39. Id.
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agreements, or prospective releases, are thought to eliminate their
incentive to do so. The second is that it is thought unfair to allow
public service entities to impose liability-avoiding agreements on
those they are supposed to serve, since the latter has no choice but
to accept such agreements.40
The court upheld the indemnity clause because neither of these
underlying principles applied. The first of these principles restates the
holding in Manson-Osberg that indemnity provisions should not be en-
forced when they tend to promote breach of a duty owed to the pub-
lic.41 In this case, the court found that the indemnity provision only
affected the state's duty toward a limited class of persons involved in a
particular undertaking. Since the state was relieved from liability only
for injuries related to the operations of the construction company,
there was "no general disincentive to the State to perform its duty to
the traveling public." 42
The second principle reflects the suggestion articulated in North-
west Airlines and indirectly in Manson-Osberg that the court should
not enforce indemnity provisions if there is an inequality of bargaining
power, especially where public service providers can insist on indemni-
fication from the public which they are supposed to serve.43 In Bur-
gess, the court found no such inequality of bargaining power,
observing that "Burgess was not compelled to contract with the state
as customers of public service organizations are."'44
Burgess demonstrates the court's concern with ensuring recovery
for the injured party. Burgess, like Manson-Osberg and Amoco, in-
volved a "three-party" indemnity situation in which the injured party
recovered for his injuries. The question in Burgess involved apportion-
ing the cost of that recovery between the parties to the contract. En-
forcing this indemnity clause did not function to exculpate the
negligent party, leaving the injured party to absorb his own loss.
40. Id. at 1381-82 (footnotes omitted).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
42. Burgess, 614 P.2d at 1382. The court noted that:
The State owes a duty to the public to maintain its highways in a safe condi-
tion. That duty, however, is not significantly affected by the indemnity
clause in this case for it only shifts liability for injuries sustained "on account
of the operations of the said Contractor." There is no general disincentive to
the State to perform its duty to the traveling public.
Id. (footnote omitted).
43. Northwest Airlines, 351 F.2d at 287 n.2; Manson-Osberg, 552 P.2d at 660 (cit-
ing Northwest Airlines, 351 F.2d at 257 n.2).
The Burgess court also cites Williston's treatise for this proposition. Burgess, 614
P.2d at 1382 n.3. The section referred to states that "a relation often represents a
situation in which the parties have not equal bargaining power; and one of them must
either accept what is offered or be deprived of the advantages of the relation." 15
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1751 at 148-49 (3d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted).
44. Burgess, 614 P.2d at 1382.
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Each of the Alaska Supreme Court decisions that dealt with the
public duty exception prior to Kuhn involved true "three-party" in-
demnity situations. In each case, the injured party recovered, and the
court enforced the indemnity agreement because it did not affect a
duty owed to the public. The dispute in these cases involved indem-
nity agreements between the state and the injured party's employer;
thus, the agreement did not affect the injured party's cause of action
for negligence.45
On the other hand, Air Transport and Northwest Airlines involved
"two-party" indemnity situations in which the injured party was also
the indemnitor, the party agreeing to the release. Had the indemnity
provision been upheld in those cases, the injured party would not have
recovered for his injuries. In both of those cases, the contractual pro-
vision was struck down because the court found that it tended to pro-
mote the breach of a duty owed to the public. 46 The pattern
established by these cases is consistent with a formal distinction be-
tween indemnity and exculpation cases, with the restrictions of the
public duty exception being applied only to the former group.
III. KUHN V STATE: APPLYING THE PUBLIC DUTY EXCEPTION
AS DEVELOPED IN ALASKA
A. Legal and Factual Background
Donald Kuhn leased his semi-tractor, along with his services as
operator, to Drilling Mud Haulers, Inc. for commercial use on the
Dalton Highway.47 The Department of Transportation issued a per-
45. See supra text accompanying notes 20-31, 37-44. See also Stephan & Sons v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 629 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1981) (following the holding in Bur-
gess that indemnity contracts are enforceable where they do not tend to breach a duty
owed to the public and there is no inequality of bargaining power similar to that
between public service companies and their customers).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 5-19. It should be noted that Northwest
Airlines involved both indemnity and exculpation issues.
47. The Dalton Highway is the only highway between Fairbanks and Prudhoe
Bay on the Arctic Ocean. To encourage commercial development of the North Slope
region, the legislature has required the Department to maintain the highway for year-
round industrial and commercial use. The statute under which the highway is main-
tained provides as follows:
ALASKA STAT. § 19.40.010. Declaration of policy. (a) The legislature finds
and declares that there is an immediate need for a public highway from the
Yukon River to the Arctic Ocean and that this public highway should be
constructed by the State of Alaska at this time because
(1) it will assist in the fulfillment of the Constitution of the State
of Alaska, art. VIII, § 1, in which it is provided that it is the policy
of the state to encourage the settlement of its land and the develop-
ment of its resources by making them available for maximum use
consistent with public interest;
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mit to Kuhn authorizing him to use the highway.48 The permit re-
quired that its holder indemnify the state for any injuries related to its
use. Kuhn was injured when he lost control of his vehicle on a steep
slope, allegedly due to the state's negligent failure to gravel the road
properly.49
Kuhn sued the state for damages, and the state moved for sum-
mary judgment, asserting that the Department regulation requiring
the indemnity provision in the permit precluded Kuhn's action.50
Kuhn opposed the state's motion, claiming that the indemnity provi-
sion was invalid because the state's maintenance of the Dalton High-
way was a public duty. The superior court rejected Kuhn's argument
and entered summary judgment for the state, finding that the indem-
(4) it will benefit local and interstate commerce because the area
north of the Yukon River is rich in natural resources but is inac-
cessible at the present time because of the lack of roads and this
inaccessibility prohibits the successful use of the natural resources
of this area;
(5) it is consistent with the Constitution of the State of Alaska,
art. VIII, § 2, in which it is provided that the legislature shall pro-
vide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natu-
ral resources belonging to the state, including land and waters, for
the maximum benefit of its people, because the highway will benefit
not only local and interstate commerce but will augment the reve-
nues of the state and result in conservation of natural resources, for
example, by facilitating a system of forest fire suppression.
ALASKA STAT. § 19.40.010 (1981).
48. Kuhn v. State, 692 P.2d 261, 263. See also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 17,
§ 30.010 (Apr. 1986). This section provides as follows:
Permits Required. No vehicle, except an emergency vehicle, may use or
travel upon the Dalton Highway, as defined in [ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit.
17, § 30.070(4) (Mar. 1984)], without a permit issued to the owner or opera-
tor of the vehicle by the commissioner or his designated representative.
49. See Brief of Appellant at 3, Kuhn, 692 P.2d 261.
50. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 263. The indemnity provisions included on the permit
itself were also codified in Department of Transportation regulatory rules:
Conditions and Enforcement. (a) Permits issued under this chapter will
include conditions and provisions which the commissioner or his designated
representative determine to be necessary to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public and travelers on the road. Permittees must agree to
comply with these conditions and provisions as well as all applicable state
and federal laws by signing the permit.
(b) The permittee shall indemnify and hold harmless the state and its rep-
resentatives, agents and employees from all suits, actions or claims of any
character brought because of any injuries or damages sustained by a person
or property in consequence of any act or omission, in any way related, di-
rectly or indirectly, to the issuance or use of the permit, of the permittee, its
representative, agents or employees, or of the State of Alaska, its representa-
tives, agents, or employees, or any other person. Each permit will include
this provision in its terms and the provision must be accepted by the permit-
tee by execution of the permit.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 30.050 (Apr. 1984).
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nity provision was enforceable.5 1
In Kuhn's appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court initially affirmed
the superior court, but later withdrew that opinion and ruled in favor
of Kuhn on rehearing. In its first opinion, the court considered
whether the indemnity provision in Kuhn's permit precluded his
suit.52 The court set out the statutory and regulatory provisions gov-
erning the maintenance and use of the Dalton Highway. 53 The court
then considered the applicability of the "public duty exception" to this
indemnity provision. Justice Compton, writing for the court, cited
Manson-Osberg v. State54 for the proposition that Alaska courts will
not enforce indemnity contracts "where the indemnity clause tends to
promote breach of duty owing to the public at large."55
The court distinguished Kuhn from Manson-Osberg, because the
earlier case had not involved an indemnity provision imposed by law.
According to the Alaska Supreme Court's first Kuhn decision, "[t]he
public duty exception has only been applied to contractual indemnity
provisions and not to indemnity provisions required by law."' 56 There-
fore, the court held that "the public duty exception cannot be applied
51. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 263. Kuhn argued that the indemnity provision was in-
valid for two additional reasons. He claimed he did not know that the indemnity
provision was in the permit and if he had known, he would not have consented to its
inclusion. He also claimed that the provision was a contract of adhesion and, there-
fore, he should not be bound by it. The court rejected both of these arguments. Id.
52. Kuhn v. State, No. 6833; No. 7080, slip op. (Alaska Aug. 5, 1983).
53. Id. at 5.
The statutory authority for state maintenance of the Dalton Highway is provided
in chapter nineteen of the Alaska statutes:
Sec. 19.40.100. Use of the highway by industrial or commercial traffic.
(2) The department shall maintain the highway and keep it open to indus-
trial or commercial traffic throughout the year.
(b) "Industrial or commercial travel"
(1) means travel necessary and related to resource exploration
and development or to support of these activities, if the individual
engaged in these activities has all necessary permits; or
(2) travel necessary and related to access by legal residents to
their property; or
(3) motor carriers engaged in commerce which are common car-
riers or contract carriers regulated by the Alaska Transportation
Commission...
Sec. 19.40.110. Public use of a portion of the highway. The department
shall maintain the section of the highway between the Yukon River and Die-
trick Camp and shall keep that section of the highway open to use by the
public between June 1 and September 1 each year.
ALASKA STAT. § 19.40.100-.110 (1981).
54. 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976). See supra text accompanying notes 20-31.
55. Kuhn, slip op. at 11 (quoting Manson-Osberg, 552 P.2d at 659-60).
56. Id. at 11.
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to invalidate an otherwise valid law requiring a person under certain
circumstances to agree to an indemnity and hold harmless provi-
sion."'5 7 Accordingly, the court initially affirmed the superior court's
decision.
The court suggested, however, that the Department's regulatory
provision might be inconsistent with its statutory duties and therefore
invalid.58 The court cited an Alaska statute providing that when a
state agency is legislatively authorized to interpret or implement a
statute, no regulation adopted by the agency is valid unless it is consis-
tent with the statute and reasonably necessary to achieve the statute's
purpose.59 The court, however, could not address this argument be-
cause Kuhn had not raised it in either the supreme court or the supe-
rior court.60
Kuhn petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the court's discussion
of the state law requiring the indemnity provision raised an issue new
to the case. The court granted a rehearing with instructions for both
parties to brief the issue of the effect of the public duty exception on a
preexisting law.61
Kuhn argued on rehearing that the regulation on which the in-
demnity clause in his contract was based was invalid. 62 Under Alaska
57. Id. at 12.
58. Id. at 13.
59. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.030 (1984)).
60. Id. at 13.
61. Kuhn, No. 6833; No. 7080 (Aug. 16, 1983) (order granting rehearing).
62. In his supplemental brief, Kuhn made a two-part argument. He first stated
that "the more persuasive line of cases hold[sic] that courts may invalidate [govern-
mental] regulations if against public policy and if no specific legislative authority for
the creation of such regulations in derogation of the common lav is present." Supple-
mental Brief for Appellant at 4 (citations omitted). Second, Kuhn argued that the
Department of Transportation's indemnity requirement was not an "otherwise valid
existing law."Id at 8. He cited Alaska Statutes section 44.62.030 (1984) for the prop-
osition that "no regulation is valid or effective unless consistent with the purpose of
the statute."Id. Kuhn noted that the Alaska Supreme Court has construed that stat-
ute to require a two-part review of regulatory provisions. First, the court determines
whether the regulation is "reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the statu-
tory provisions."Id. Second, the court must decide whether the regulation is "reason-
able and not arbitrary." Id. (citing Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1971)).
Kuhn then asserted that the regulation under consideration failed both parts of
this test. He claimed that instead of carrying out the purposes of the statute the regu-
lation was actually a disincentive for the state to perform its statutory duty to main-
tain the highway. Finally, he argued that the regulation was arbitrary and
unreasonable because:
it is in derogation of the common law prohibition against exculpatory agree-
ments in matters concerning public duty; and because it arbitrarily elimi-
nates common law action for redress for injury to those drivers who are
owner/operator employees while leaving intact such actions for those drivers
who are mere employees.
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statute:
[I]f, by express or implied terms of a statute, a state agency has
authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make spe-
cific or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no regula-
tion adopted is valid or effective unless consistent with the statute
and reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the statute.63
In the leading case interpreting this statutory language, Kelly v.
Zamarello, 64 the supreme court outlined a two-part test for determin-
ing the validity of administrative regulations:
First, we will ascertain whether the regulation is consistent with and
reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the statutory pro-
visions conferring rulemaking authority on the agency. This aspect
of review insures that the agency has not exceeded the power dele-
gated by the legislature. Second, we will determine whether the reg-
ulation is reasonable and not arbitrary. This latter inquiry is proper
in the review of any legislative enactment. 65
To apply these standards to the regulatory provision in contro-
versy, the reviewing court looks first to the legislative enactment. 66 In
the Dalton Highway legislation, the legislature directed the Depart-
ment to adopt regulations "necessary to accomplish the purposes" of
the Act. 67 Kuhn argued that, while the statute grants the Department
the authority to make rules concerning the use and maintenance of the
highway, the indemnity provision contained in the Alaska Adminis-
trative Code and in Kuhn's permit was inconsistent with the state's
statutory duty to maintain the highway. According to Kuhn, the in-
demnity provision created a disincentive to the state's exercise of
proper care in the construction and maintenance of its highways.68
B. Opinion on Rehearing
In its opinion on rehearing, the supreme court apparently
adopted sub silentio Kuhn's argument that the indemnity provision
was not a valid law.69 The invalidation of the regulation did not, how-
Supplemental Brief at 8, 9.
63. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.030 (1984).
64. 486 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1971). See also Union Oil Co. v. State, 574 P.2d 1266,
1271 (Alaska 1978) (noting that an administrative regulation carries the presumption
of validity); Alaska Int'l. Indus., Inc. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Alaska 1979)
(noting the proper standard of review as "within its scope of authority" and "in a
reasonable and not arbitrary manner"); Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831, 834-35
(Alaska 1972).
65. Kelly, 486 P.2d at 911.
66. Id. at 912.
67. ALASKA STAT. § 19.40.065 (1981).
68. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 8-9; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. at 5-7.
69. The court necessarily reached this conclusion because, if the regulation were
valid, it would take precedence over a common law rule, such as the public duty
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ever, remove the issue of indemnity from the case, because the indem-
nity provision remained in Kuhn's permit.70 By signing the permit,
Kuhn was still contractually bound to the terms of the provision, un-
less the common law or some other statute invalidated it.7' Thus, the
court finally confronted the issue of whether the public duty exception
invalidated the indemnity provision in the permit.
As a preliminary conclusion, the court assumed that if the Dalton
Highway were open to the general public year-round the indemnity
provision would be unenforceable because it would tend "to promote
breach of a duty owing to the public at large."72 The Kuhn court con-
cluded that "[t]he provision at issue here can thus be found valid only
if, as the state argues, the public duty exception is inapplicable when a
duty is owed to less than the entire public."'73 The state contended
that the public duty exception should not apply because the Dalton
Highway was open only to specified users, not to the "public at large,"
during the period in which Kuhn was injured.74
The court disagreed with the state and held that " 'public at large'
must only mean those persons for whom public services and facilities
are performed and maintained, in this case authorized users of the
Dalton Highway."'75 The court then, applying the principles underly-
ing the public duty exception set forth in Burgess, invalidated the in-
demnity provision in Kuhn's permit.76 Specifically, the court held:
The purposes of the exception, as expressed in Burgess, support its
application in this case. First, the state must be required to guard
against the consequences of its negligence. Even though its duty
exception. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.010 (1982) ("Applicability of common law not in-
consistent with the Constitution of the United States or with any law passed by the
legislature of the State of Alaska is the rule of decision in this state." (emphasis
added)).
70. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 30.050 (Mar. 1984). See also Kuhn, 692
P.2d at 263.
71. In this case, the "Statement of Vehicle Owner or Agent," which declared that
the signor had read all provisions of the permit, was signed by an employee of Kuhn's
lessee, Drilling Mud Haulers, rather than by Kuhn himself. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 263.
On first hearing, Kuhn argued that he should not be bound by the indemnity provi-
sions because he did not sign the permit, did not know of the provisions, and would
not have consented to them had he known. The court dismissed this argument, hold-
ing that Kuhn was bound under principles of agency by estoppel. Kuhn, slip op. at 11.
72. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 264 (citing Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 659-
60 (Alaska 1976)). See also Burgess Constr. Co. v. State, 614 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Alaska
1980) ("The State owes a duty to the public to maintain its highways in a safe
condition.").
73. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 264.
74. Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 15 n.10. See also ALASKA STAT.
§ 19.40.100-.110 (1981), quoted supra at note 53.
75. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 266.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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runs only to a specified segment of the population, the state is statu-
torily required to maintain the highway year-round, and the indem-
nity provision tends to eliminate the incentive for doing so non-
negligently.... Second, as noted in Burgess, it may be unfair to
allow the state to impose "liability-avoiding agreements on those [it
is] supposed to serve, since the latter have no choice but to accept
such agreements." Kuhn and other authorized users of this public
highway in fact have no choice in the matter. They must use this
highway. They must accept this indemnity provision. 77
Two additional points about Kuhn should be noted. First, the
holding does not conflict with the principle of sovereign immunity.
The state's action in failing to gravel the Dalton Highway properly
was not a "discretionary act," protected by the state's right to immu-
nity.78 Second, the court's holding in Kuhn does not threaten the
state's ability to protect itself from liability in cases like Donald
Kuhn's. The state has at least two alternatives: (1) The legislature
could provide in the statute itself that a user of a highway must agree
to indemnify the state; or (2) the legislature could, by statute, author-
ize the Department to adopt any necessary regulations, "including,
but not limited to," a requirement that a user of a highway indemnify
the state against liability. In either case, the statutory provision would
77. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 266.
78. See Freeman v. State, 705 P.2d 918 (Alaska 1985). In Freeman, the court
held that the state was immune from tort liability in an action resulting from a policy
decision by the Department of Transportation not to implement dust control meas-
ures. Id. at 919. The court noted that the decision was one that involved "basic polit-
ical, social or economic factors." Id. at 920. Therefore, the Department's decision in
Freeman was immune from liability under the "planning-operational test" which had
been adopted in State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972). According to the Free-
man decision:
Under the planning-operational test, decisions that rise to the level of plan-
ning or policy formulation will be considered discretionary acts immune
from tort liability, whereas decisions that are operational in nature, thereby
implementing policy decisions, will not be considered discretionary and
therefore will not be shielded from liablity.
Freeman, 705 P.2d at 920 (quoting Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47, 64 (Alaska 1981)).
See generally Note, Sovereign Immunity and the Discretionary Function Exception of
the Alaska Tort Claims Act, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 99 (1985).
In Freeman, the court distinguished Kuhn because in Kuhn the state did not
argue that the acts involved were immune from liability as discretionary acts. Free-
man, 705 P.2d at 920. In Kuhn, it was clear that the department had a statutory duty
to maintain the highway for use by certain persons. See supra note 53 and accompany-
ing text. Using the political-social-economic criteria set forth above, it is logical to
place an economically-based decision, like that involved in Freeman, not to implement
dust control procedures, under the protection of sovereign immunity because of the
decision's "planning" characteristics. The failure to gravel a highway properly is
much more clearly an "operational" function and thus is not protected by sovereign
immunity.
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be controlling, and the public duty exception would not apply.79
In Kuhn, as in Northwest Airlines80 and Air Transport, 81 the in-
jured party was an indemnitor, and enforcement of the indemnity pro-
vision would have barred the injured party's suit. In each case, the
court invalidated the indemnity provision, concluding that the subject
matter of the contract concerned a public duty. In Kuhn, however, it
is arguable that the contract did not involve a public duty. In finding
a public duty in activities which are essentially private in character,
Kuhn takes a step beyond the Ninth Circuit cases. The lease in North-
west Airlines, for example, required that the airport be available "to
the aeronautical public on a non-discriminatory basis."'82 In Air
Transport, the airport was "available for use to commercial planes."'83
In both cases there was a clear duty to the public. In Kuhn, however,
the public duty exception was held to cover an indemnity provision
which affected only three discrete groups of statutorily identified "in-
dustrial or commercial" users.84 The fact that the court was willing to
stretch the definition of "the public at large" in this case may indicate
that it implicitly distinguishes between exculpation and indemnity sit-
uations and applies the public duty exception more willingly in the
former situation.
IV. POST-KUHN: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS,
FURTHER QUESTIONS
In its most recent opinion on the public duty exception, Rogers &
Babler, a Division of Mapco Alaska, Inc. v. State,85 the Alaska
Supreme Court confirmed that the principles stated in Burgess consti-
tute the proper rationale behind the public duty exception. Rogers &
Babler involved a contract for the construction of a state highway.
The contract required that the contractor indemnify the state for ac-
tions brought against it arising out of the contruction work. 86 During
79. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68 (explaining why the regulatory pro-
vision did not carry the authority of statutory law).
80. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
82. 351 F.2d at 255.
83. 221 F.2d at 469.
84. ALASKA STAT. § 19.40.100 (1981); see supra note 53.
85. 713 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1986).
86. Id. at 796.
The indemnity provision stated:
Responsibility for Damage Claims. The Contractor shall indemnify and
save harmless the Department, its officers and employees, from all suits,
actions, or claims of any character brought because of any injuries or
damage received or sustained by any person, persons or property on
account of the operations of said Contractor; or on account of or in
consequence of any neglect in safe-guarding the work; or through use of
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this construction work, a motorcycle rider was killed as a result of the
alleged negligence of both the state and the contractor. The accident
occurred when the rider struck a traffic "divider" which was normally
guarded by reflective barricades. The state's negligence was aggra-
vated by the fact that before the accident a state airport safety officer
had noticed that the barricades were missing, but had taken no action
to replace them.87
After settling with the personal representative of the motorcycle
rider, the state sued Rogers & Babler for breach of the indemnity
agreement. The contractor contended that the indemnity provision
was unenforceable because of the public duty exception. s The Alaska
Supreme Court found that the exception did not apply, emphasizing
that the contract "remains a voluntary agreement entered into be-
tween two sophisticated parties who could allocate risks and costs
through the bidding process."8' 9 Thus, the second part of the Burgess
test did not apply because Rogers & Babler could have negotiated a
different contract. Unlike Kuhn, Rogers & Babler had a choice as to
whether to accept the provisions of the contract.
Aside from confirming the Burgess standard, Rogers & Babler de-
veloped the analysis of the public duty exception in two additional
ways. First, and most importantly, the court emphasized that the sec-
ond branch of the Burgess test focuses on the relationship between the
parties to the contract.90 The fact that the victim was a member of the
public was not important to its determination. The contractual rela-
tionship was the important factor. By emphasizing this relationship,
the court seems to require that the indemnity provision meet both
parts of the Burgess test. In Rogers & Babler, although the court did
not address the issue, the state obviously owed a duty to the public to
maintain its roads properly. 91 The court noted that, because the perti-
nent relationship was that between the parties to the contract, "the
fact that [the cyclist] was a member of the public is irrelevant."92
unacceptable materials in constructing the work; or because of any act
or omission, neglect, or misconduct of said Contractor.
Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 797.
89. Id. at 799.
The court also noted that, "[t]raditionally this court has held that the public duty
exception does not apply to contracts between the state and a construction contrac-
tor." Id. (citing Burgess, 614 P.2d 1380 (Alaska 1980), and Stephan & Sons v. Munic-
ipality of Anchorage, 629 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1981)).
90. Rogers & Babler, 713 P.2d at 799 (emphasis added).
91. See Burgess, 614 P.2d at 1382. The Burgess court stated: "The State owes a
duty to the public to maintain its highways in a safe condition." Id. (footnote
omitted).
92. Rogers & Babler, 713 P.2d at 799.
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Second, this case may also show the implicit recognition by the
court of the distinction between indemnity and exculpation. In this
case, as in Manson-Osberg and Burgess, enforcing the clause did not
prevent the injured party from recovering. The court merely deter-
mined the allocation of the cost of the settlement amount among the
parties to the indemnity contract. This case differs from Kuhn and the
Ninth Circuit cases in which enforcing the exculpatory clause would
have forced the victim to bear the costs of the negligent party's acts. 93
The Alaska Supreme Court seems to have firmly settled upon a
two-part standard for determining when the public duty exception will
apply to invalidate indemnity contracts: (1) there must be a duty
owed to the public and the indemnity provision must tend to reduce
the incentive of the party who has that duty to guard against his own
negligence, and (2) the relationship between the parties to the contract
must give the indemnitee an unfair advantage in insisting upon the
indemnity provision because the indemnitor is dependent upon the
services the indemnitee offers. 94
While the Burgess test is well established, the court has not
clearly explained whether both parts of the test must be met for the
exception to apply or whether the parts of the test should be balanced.
93. The court also considered the effect of ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.900 (1980)
upon the indemnity provision. That section states:
Indemnification Agreements Contra to Public Policy. A provision, clause,
covenant, or agreement contained in, collateral to, or affecting any construc-
tion contract which purports to indemnify the promisee against liability for
damages for (1) death or bodily injury to persons, (2) injury to property,
(3) design defects or (4) any other loss, damage or expense arising under (1),
(2), or (3) of this section arising from the sole negligence or wilful miscon-
duct of the promisee or the promisee's agents, servants or independent con-
tractors who are directly responsible to the promisee, is against public policy
and is void and unenforceable; however, this provision does not affect the va-
lidity of any insurance contract, workers' compensation or agreement issued
by an insurer subject to the provisions of ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.03.010-
21.90.110 (1984)].
ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.900 (1980) (emphasis added). The court held that the statute
did not invalidate the indemnity provision. According to the court, "[ALASKA STAT.
45.45.900] should come into effect only when it is determined, as between the state
and the contractors, that the state is solely negligent." Rogers & Babler, 713 P.2d at
798 (emphasis added). In this case, both the state and the contractor were sued for
negligence and the state agreed to a settlement with the plaintiff before bringing this
action against Rogers & Babler for breach of their agreement to indemnify. Id. at 796.
Alaska Statute section 45.45.900 invalidates indemnity clauses in construction
contracts in which the purported indemnitee is found to be solely negligent. The sec-
tion, however, does allow the indemnitee to secure insurance when indemnity provi-
sions are not prohibited. The effect of the legislation is that parties to construction
contracts may not seek indemnity for their sole negligence and should instead obtain
liability insurance for damages resulting from such negligence.
94. See Burgess, 614 P.2d at 1382; see also Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 266. See supra notes
40-44 & 77 and accompanying text.
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In Burgess, neither part of the test applied. The court found that while
the state owed a duty to the public to maintain its roads, this duty was
"not significantly affected" by the indemnity clause because the clause
shifted liability for only a limited number of people and did not reduce
the state's incentive to maintain the highways properly for the "travel-
ing public."' 95 The second part of the test did not apply because "Bur-
gess was not compelled to contract with the State as customers of
public service organizations often are."'96
In Kuhn, on the other hand, both parts of the Burgess test ap-
plied. The court found that the state owed a duty to the public to
maintain the Dalton Highway and that there was a customer-public
service entity relationship between Kuhn and the state.97 Thus, in
neither of these cases did the court actually have to decide whether a
strong showing on only one part of the test could trigger the exception.
Finally, in Rogers & Babler, the very circumstances of the acci-
dent indicate that the state did not properly guard against the conse-
quences of its own negligence. Since the indemnity provision absolved
the state from the responsibility to pay damages, the clause may well
have removed some of the state's incentive for care. But, the second
part of the Burgess test was not satisfied because of the relatively equal
bargaining positions of the two parties. The court's holding that the
exception did not apply may indicate that the most important part of
the test is the second part or, at least, that both parts must always
apply to trigger the operation of the public duty exception.
In sum, the Alaska courts have only begun to suggest the parame-
ters of the public duty exception. As a result, it is not clear under
what circumstances courts will deem parties to have a public duty that
will render liability-avoiding clauses in their contracts unenforceable.
On the basis of existing Alaska Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, the public duty exception applies to operators of public airfields
and to the state when it owes a duty to the public to maintain a high-
95. The clause only shifted liability for "injuries sustained on account of the oper-
ations of the said Contractor." Burgess, 614 P.2d at 1382.
96. In Rogers & Babler the court noted three important differences between
Kuhn, in which the public duty exception did apply, and Burgess, in which it did not
apply:
1. The relationship between Kuhn and the state was "that of one who fur-
nishes public services to one who uses them.";
2. Users of the Dalton Highway were compelled to contract with the state;
and,
3. Highway users cannot pass on insurance costs to the state like a con-
struction contractor may do through the bidding process.
Rogers & Babler, 713 P.2d at 799 (citations omitted). All of these distinctions address
the relationship between the contracting parties, which is the subject of the second
part of the Burgess test.
97. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 266.
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way. Dicta in Burgess suggests it will apply "to public utilities and
common carriers. ' 98 Practitioners cannot now predict with certainty
the identity of other parties whom the exception covers. Additionally,
Alaska courts have not expressly stated whether the exception applies
to true three-party indemnity situations as well as exculpatory situa-
tions. Finally, the courts have not decided whether a particular situa-
tion must satisfy both of the Burgess factors in order to trigger the
operation of the exception. Other jurisdictions, however, have much
more experience with the public duty exception. This note next ex-
plores California law as a suggestive model for the future development
of Alaska law.
V. THE PUBLIC DUTY EXCEPTION IN CALIFORNIA
The California courts have developed a systematic method of
dealing with the public duty exception and an extensive body of case
law which illustrates how the exception is applied. For these reasons,
California jurisprudence provides a useful reference for the develop-
ment of Alaska law on the public duty exception.
A. Distinguishing Between Indemnity and Exculpation
The California courts expressly differentiate between indemnity
provisions and exculpatory clauses and apply the public duty excep-
tion only to the latter. This approach reflects the basic policy differen-
tiation between the two arrangements: "An [exculpatory clause] may
deprive a victim of compensation for injuries but an agreement to in-
demnify a person who may be responsible for a loss is additional assur-
ance that the loss will be compensated." 99
As argued above, the Alaska Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
decisions discussed previously may have implicitly accepted the dis-
tinction between indemnity and exculpation in applying the public
duty exception. In each of the cases involving an attempted exculpa-
tion, Air Transport, Northwest Airlines, and Kuhn, the courts have
struck down the clause in controversy. In each of the cases involving
a true indemnification, Manson-Osberg, Amoco, Burgess and Rogers &
Babler, the courts have upheld the indemnity clause. It is submitted
that accepting the formal distinction between indemnity and exculpa-
tion clauses will create more predictability in the resolution of future
cases and allow for the development of a more logical body of juris-
prudence on the subject.1°°
98. Burgess, 614 P.2d at 1381.
99. Lemat Corp. v. American Basketball Ass'n., 51 Cal. App. 3d 267, 278, 124
Cal. Rptr. 388, 395-96 (1975).
100. Not all jurisdictions treat indemnity clauses and exculpatory clauses differ-
ently in applying the public duty exception. In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Roth
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The major rationale for providing more stringent standards for
exculpatory clauses than for indemnity clauses is to assure that the
injured party recovers for his injury. If Alaska chooses to follow this
distinction, the injured party will recover from the negligent party in
the exculpatory clause cases in which the public duty exception ap-
plies. The injured party will also recover in the indemnity cases, leav-
ing the legal dispute to be resolved between the indemnitee and
indemnitor. Courts can handle this dispute by resort to general con-
tract principles such as unconscionability and adhesion and by special
statutory provisions. 0 1
Packing Co., 323 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1963), the Eighth Circuit applied the Restatement
(First) of Contracts standard on contracts for the exemption from liability for negli-
gence to a "three-party" indemnity contract. Id. at 927-29 (citing RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 574-575 (1932)). See supra note 10 and accompanying
text. In Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 95 Colo. 99, 33 P.2d 974 (1934),
the Colorado Supreme Court applied the public duty exception to an indemity clause
under which an elevator repair company sought indemnity from the owners of a build-
ing. The building's patrons had sued the repair company after being injured in an
elevator in that building. Finally, in the Ninth Circuit's Northwest Airlines decision,
there was an indemnity provision under which Alaska Airlines was to defend and hold
harmless Northwest Airlines from suits by those passengers injured due to the negli-
gence of Northwest. The Ninth Circuit struck this indemnity clause under the same
standard that it used to strike the exculpatory provisions included in that case. North-
west Airlines, 351 F.2d at 258; see supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
101. Alaska has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides as
follows:
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or a clause of the
contract was unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the un-
conscionable clause, or so limit the application of an unconscionable clause
as to avoid an unconscionable result.
(b) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause of
the contract may be unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302 (1980). This section was applied in Morrow v. New Moon
Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976), in which the court stated that "[i]t is in-
cumbent on the courts of Alaska to enforce the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code when applicable, including the doctrine of unconscionability embodied in
[ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.072 (a prior codification of section 45.02.302)]." Id. at 292
n.43.
The court also cited with approval a standard for identifying cases in which a
contract should be held unconscionable: "Unconscionablity has generally been recog-
nized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Id. (quot-
ing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
See also City and Borough of Juneau v. Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d 954
(Alaska 1981) (holding that an indemnity agreement between the city and a utility
company was not unconscionable where the terms were negotiated at arm's length and
were fair to both parties).
Additionally, principles of adhesion may be applied to the indemnity contract.
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Because enforcement of hold harmless agreements reduces the in-
centive of protected parties to exercise reasonable care, it may be ar-
gued that Alaska should apply the public duty exception to indemnity
provisions as well as exculpatory clauses. 102 It is submitted, however,
that the Alaska courts have already abandoned this rationale by im-
plicitly distinguishing between indemnity and exculpation. In both
Burgess and Rogers & Babler, the state had a duty to maintain its
roads properly and the indemnity clause reduced the state's incentive
to fulfill its duty. Yet, in both of those cases, the Alaska Supreme
Court upheld the indemnity provisions.
B. Comparing the California Standards with the Alaska Approach
1. The Tunkl Standards. In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of
California, 10 3 the California Supreme Court established a six-part test
for determining whether the subject matter of a contract affects the
"public interest." In that case, Hugo Tunkl was admitted to a hospital
after signing a "release" which purported to exculpate the hospital
from all liability for the negligence of its staff.1 4 Tunkl later sued the
These principles have received most recent judicial attention in reference to insurance
contract litigation. See Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63
(Alaska 1977) (noting that insurance policies may be considered contracts of adhesion
because of the inequality of bargaining power between insurer and insured, and thus
should be construed in favor of the policy holder); see also Weaver Bros., Inc. v. Chap-
pel, 684 P.2d 123 (Alaska 1984).
Principles of adhesion have, however, been considered by the Alaska Supreme
Court outside of the insurance context. In Burgess Constr. Co. v. State, 614 P.2d
1380 (Alaska 1980), the court refused to apply principles of adhesion to invalidate an
indemnity provision in a contract between the state and a highway construction com-
pany. The court stressed that because the parties were of essentially equal bargaining
power, the construction company could not claim that it was forced to accept the
provision on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. Id. at 1383-84.
The Burgess court cited with approval a commentator who defines an adhesion
contract as a "standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of
superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity
to adhere to the contract or reject it." Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Sug-
gested Redefinition and Its Application to Banking, 11 LoY. L. REv. 297, 301 (1978)
(quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 691, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (1961)).
Finally, specific statutory provisions may govern the enforcement of certain in-
demnity provisions. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.900 (1980), quoted supra at note 93;
see also Rogers & Babler, Div. of Mapco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 713 P.2d 795 (Alaska
1986) (confining the application of section 45.45.900 to cases in which the party seek-
ing indemnity is found to be solely negligent).
102. See supra note 100.
103. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
104. Id. at 94, 383 P.2d at 442, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The document provides as
follows:
RELEASE: The hospital is a non-profit, charitable institution. In considera-
tion of the hospital and allied services to be rendered and the rates charged
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hospital, claiming that he had been injured due to the negligence of
two physicians employed by the hospital. At trial, the jury sustained
the validity of the release finding no violation of California Civil Code
section 1668, which governs exculpatory clauses. 105
On appeal, the California Supreme Court noted that previous de-
cisions interpreting section 1668 had consistently held that exculpa-
tory clauses that affected "the public interest" could not be
enforced.106 The court held that the exculpatory clause in Tunkl af-
fected the public interest and was therefore illegal under section
1668.107
In its opinion, the Tunkl court examined California precedent
construing the meaning of "the public interest." Finding that "[n]o
definition of the concept of public interest can be contained within the
four corners of a formula,"'108 the court enumerated six situations
which tend to concern "the public interest." Under the court's often-
quoted analysis, an exculpatory clause which involves some or all of
the following situational factors is invalid:
(1) It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for
public regulation.
(2) The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a ser-
vice of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of
practical necessity for some members of the public.
(3) The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service
for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any mem-
ber coming within certain established standards.
(4) As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the eco-
nomic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation
possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services.
(5) In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts
the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation,
and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional
reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence.
(6) Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of
the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the
therefor, the patient or his legal representative agrees to and hereby releases
The Regents of the University of California, and the hospital from any and
all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees, if
the hospital has used due care in selecting its employees.
Id.
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985) provides that "[a]ll contracts which have
for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of laws
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of law."
106. Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 96, 383 P.2d at 443, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
107. Id. at 101-104, 383 P.2d at 447-48, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
108. Id. at 98, 383 P.2d at 444, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.10 9
The court emphasized that only some of these characteristics must be
established in order to invalidate an exculpatory clause. In Tunkl, the
court found that the hospital's release exhibited each of the
characteristics. "10
2. Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker: Limited Acceptance of
the Tunkl Standards. In a recent opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court
has shown a willingness to look to the Tunkl standards in determining
the validity of exculpatory clauses in contracts which involve a public
duty - at least in some circumstances. Municipality of Anchorage v.
Locker11' concerned the validity of an exculpatory clause used by the
publisher of a telephone directory. The telephone company attempted
to limit its potential liability for errors and omissions made in the
processing of advertisements in its "yellow pages" (commercial direc-
tory). 112 The clause purported to limit an advertiser's recovery to the
cost paid for the particular advertisement 13
These facts presented the Alaska Supreme Court with another op-
portunity to apply the public duty exception analysis. Indeed, most
courts that had considered the issue had examined the clause under
such an analysis. Inexplicably, however, the court cited none of its
prior decisions concerning the public duty exception; instead, the
court applied a hybrid unconscionabilty test. First, citing Tunkl, the
supreme court determined that the "publication of the Yellow Pages is
affected with a public interest.1114 The Locker court, however, only
considered the first three Tunkl standards in making this
determination. "15
Then, because it determined that the contract was affected with a
public interest, the court decided to "more clearly scrutinize" the in-
teraction between the telephone company and its advertiser to deter-
mine whether the clause was an unconscionable part of the
contract.1 6 Applying reasoning expressed in previous Alaska uncon-
scionability cases, 1 7 the court found that the clause was unconsciona-
109. Id. at 98-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
110. Id. at 101, 383 P.2d at 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
111. No. 3100 slip op. (Alaska Aug. 22, 1986).
112. Id. at 2-3.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
In Tunk, the California Supreme Court noted that all of the standards in the test
need not be met in each case in order for the exception to apply. See supra text accom-
panying note 110. The point here is that the Alaska Supreme Court did not even
consider the final three Tunkl standards as a part of its analysis.
116. Id. at 11.
117. See Vochner v. Erikson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986).
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ble because it involved "a vast disparity of bargaining power coupled
with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party."118
Although the Alaska Supreme Court's unconscionability analysis
involves some of the same considerations as the latter three Tunkl
standards, the form of the court's analysis differs significantly from
that of California and other jurisdictions that apply the Tunkl stan-
dards. Both Alaska's unconscionability analysis and the latter three
Tunkl standards require an evaluation of the relative bargaining power
of the parties. The unconscionabilty analysis, however, looks beyond
the bargaining power to scrutinize the terms of the exculpation.
Under the Tunkl standards, as long as the court determines that the
circumstances surrounding the exculpatory clause tend to implicate
"the public interest," the court will invalidate the clause without ex-
amining its substantive terms. The Alabama Supreme Court took this
approach in Morgan v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 119 a "yellow
pages" case cited in Locker. That court simply applied the Tunkl
standards and, finding that the standards were fulfilled, invalidated the
exculpatory clause. 120
Locker's significance in Alaska jurisprudence concerning the pub-
lic duty exception is unclear because of the court's failure to refer to
any prior Alaska decisions on the exception. 21 The situation in
Locker is fundamentally indistinguishable from that in Kuhn. In both
cases, the concerns expressed in Alaska cases on the public duty ex-
ception and in the Tunkl standards require that a court invalidate the
exculpatory clause. 122 Yet in Locker, the Alaska Supreme Court,
without explanation, departed from the analysis that it had used in
Kuhn and other decisions. The Locker decision raises several ques-
118. Locker, slip op. at 11-15 (citing Vochner, 712 P.2d at 381-83); see supra note
101.
119. 466 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1985).
120. Id. at 117-18.
This is also the way that the California Supreme Court applied its test in the
Tunkl opinion itself. 60 Cal. 2d at 101-104, 383 P.2d at 447-48, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39-41.
The other two "yellow pages" exculpation cases cited in Locker did, however, apply a
mixed public duty and unconscionability analysis in holding that the clause was unen-
forceable. See Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 117 Wis.
2d 587, 345 N.W.2d 417 (1984); Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632,
171 N.W.2d 689 (1969). The better approach is that taken by the Alabama Supreme
Court, which stated in applying the Tunkl standards: "A review of the various meth-
ods by which other states have dealt with exculpatory clauses and their refusal to
enforce them convinces us that the best rule, and the simplest in application, is that
exculpatory clauses affecting the public interest are invalid." Morgan, 466 So. 2d at
117.
121. Because the Alaska Supreme Court did not apply its public duty analysis, nor
cite its case law on the subject in deciding Locker, this note has not discussed the case
as a part of the development of the public duty exception in Alaska.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 124-128.
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tions. Is this case the Alaska Supreme Court's most recent statement
on the public duty exception? Is the holding merely confined to excul-
patory clauses and inapplicable to indemnity clauses? Is the holding
confined to cases in the telephone directory advertising area?123 In
resolving these questions, the Alaska Supreme Court should adopt the
Tunkl criteria and the traditional method of applying these criteria in
all exculpation cases as a means of determining which factual situa-
tions involve a public duty. Application of the Tunkl criteria would
not change the results of Kuhn and Locker, yet it would provide for
more consistent and predictable analysis in future exculpation cases.
3. Similarities Between the Tunkl Standards and the Traditional
Alaska Approach. The principles underlying the six-part test adopted
in Tunkl parallel those of the Alaska approach to the public duty ex-
ception. The first three standards of the Tunkl approach essentially
concern the existence of a public duty, the first element of the Burgess
test. The last three Tunkl standards measure the equality of bargain-
ing power of the two parties, the second Burgess factor. Accordingly,
the two approaches may produce identical results in many cases.
For example, the clause struck down under the public duty excep-
tion in Kuhn would also have been unenforceable under the Tunkl
test. (1) The Dalton Highway's maintenance is provided for in the
state's statutes. 124 (2) The state, which sought the "indemnity," was
engaged in an activity necessary to those members of the public who
needed transportation between the Yukon River and Prudhoe Bay.12 5
(3) The highway maintenance provided by the state was available to
members of the public who met the statutory standards. 126 (4) The
state had superior bargaining strength because the Dalton Highway
was the only highway between the Yukon River and Prudhoe Bay
available for Kuhn's use.' 27 (5) The Department of Transportation
regulation established the form of the permit; therefore, the terms
were subject to no negotiation.128 (6) Finally, because of these factors,
Kuhn was under the control of the state and subject to the risk of its
careless highway maintenance. The results of Kuhn would be identi-
cal under the Alaska and the California approaches to the public duty
exception.
123. The cases cited in Locker as following the Tunkl standards each involved ex-
culpatory provisions in telephone directory advertising contracts. See Alien, 18 Mich.
App. at 632, 171 N.W.2d at 689, and Morgan, 466 So. 2d at 107.
124. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 19.40.010-.210 (1981).
125. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 19.40.100-.110 (1981); see supra note 53.
126. For a list of those persons allowed to use the Dalton Highway see id.
127. Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 262.
128. Id. at 262-263. See also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 30.050 (1984).
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C. Advantages of the California Approach
Reference to California case law on the public duty exception
would refine the Alaska courts' development of the exception in two
ways. First, the six-part Tunkl test improves the ability of practition-
ers to distinguish factual situations in which the public duty exception
will apply. Second, California's vast body of case law on the public
duty exception illustrates specific situations, such as landlord-tenant
or banking relationships, where the public duty exception applies.
1. The Tunkl Distinctions. The first part of the Burgess test can be
broken down into the first three parts of the Tunkl test. Under the
first part of the Alaska standard, there must be a duty owed to the
public and the indemnity provision must tend to reduce the incentive
of the party who has that duty to guard against his own negligence.'
29
The California approach particularizes this standard making it easier
to apply to actual problems, but the California approach does not
change the basic principle adopted by the Alaska court. Tunkl also
addresses the "public at large" question confronted in Kuhn. 130 The
California court held that all members of the public did not need to
qualify for the services of the hospital. The court stated that the party
must "[hold] himself out as willing to perform this service for any
member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming
within certain established standards."
13 1
The final three parts of the Tunkl test have the same practical
effect as the second part of the Alaska approach, which requires that
the relationship between the parties to the contract must give the in-
demnitee an unfair advantage in insisting upon the indemnity provi-
sion because the indemnitor requires the services the indemnitee
offers.1 32 The California approach focuses specifically on, first,
whether the proponent of the clause has superior bargaining power;
second, whether the proponent exercises this power in confronting the
other party with a standardized contract of adhesion; and finally,
whether the execution of the contract submits the party to the risk of
the proponent's carelessness.
133
By applying the Tunkl standards, Alaska courts can remain true
to the principles underlying the public duty exception set forth in Bur-
gess and Kuhn, and yet more predictably specify those situations in
129. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
130. See Kuhn, 692 P.2d at 266. The Alaska court stated: "We conclude that
'public at large' must only mean those persons for whom public services and facilities
are performed and maintained .... ." Id.
131. Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 99, 383 P.2d at 445, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
132. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
133. Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 99-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
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which courts should apply the public duty exception. This particular-
ization would aid courts, practitioners, and laypersons in determining
when the exception would render exculpatory contract provisions
unenforceable.
2. The Case Law Under the Tunkl Standards. During the years
since the Tunkl decision, the California courts have developed a large
body of case law applying this formulation of the public duty excep-
tion. This case law suggests the directions in which Alaska courts
might proceed in applying the exception.
One California court applied the Tunkl test to strike an exculpa-
tory clause, which was entitled an "indemnification," in a private lease
agreement. 34 Under Tunkl, another court invalidated an exculpatory
clause purporting to protect an irrigation district (an agency of the
state of California) from liability arising as the result of flooding.135 A
California court relied upon the Tunkl standards to prevent enforce-
ment of an agreement to exculpate a bank for its negligence in han-
dling funds deposited in a night deposit vault. 136 On the other hand,
courts have held that the Tunkl criteria do not affect exculpatory
clauses where the subject matter of the contract is not a service neces-
sary to any members of the public. For example, in one case, a Cali-
fornia court held that a release signed by a participant in a motorcycle
race was valid. The court stated that "by no means other than a most
strained construction could the exculpatory instrument in issue in-
volve the public interest." 137
The holdings in cases arising outside of California in which courts
have applied the Tunkl standards also identify situations in which the
exception might be applied. The Tennessee Supreme Court applied
these standards to prevent the enforcement of a clause by which a phy-
sician sought to exculpate himself from liability for his potential negli-
gence in performing an abortion. 138 The Alabama Supreme Court
used the standards to invalidate an agreement under which a tele-
phone company sought to be released from liability for errors and
omissions occurring in its customer directory.'3 9 Finally, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court applied the Tunkl standards to prevent enforce-
134. Henrioulle v. Main Ventures, 20 Cal. 3d 512, 515-18, 573 P.2d 465, 468-69,
143 Cal. Rptr. 247, 249-50 (1978).
135. Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 172 Cal. App. 3d 914,
218 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1985).
136. Vilner v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 89 Cal. App. 3d 732, 152 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1979).
137. McAtee v. Newhall Land & Farming Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 265 (1985); see also Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d 333,
214 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1985) (parachuting).
138. Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977).
139. Morgan, 466 So. 2d 107.
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ment of an exculpatory clause under which a county sought to be
released from negligence in its operation of county fair facilities.1 40
On the other hand, courts have enforced exculpatory clauses where
the contract was one for recreational services that were not necessary
to the public.' 4 '
Despite the Tunkl court's admonition that not all of the stan-
dards need be met in each case in order for the exception to apply, the
analysis of cases in which some of these factors are missing necessarily
involves a balancing approach. The court must balance the absence of
some of the standards against those factors that are present to deter-
mine whether the exculpatory clause is enforceable. One California
case provides guidance for this balancing. In Cregg v. Ministor Ven-
tures, 142 a California court of appeals held that an exculpation of a
landlord from liability for his negligence toward one of his tenants was
valid under Tunkl. In the lease, the landlord specifically provided that
in return for payment of a slightly higher rent he would purchase in-
surance for the tenant's property. 143 While courts have invalidated
exculpatory clauses in other private leases,144 the court enforced this
clause because the lease was not a contract of adhesion. The lease
arrangement did not place the tenant under the landlord's control, or
subject the tenant to the risk of the landlord's carelessness or to an
abuse of the landlord's superior bargaining power. 145 Cregg shows
that the balancing of factors under the Tunkl standard involves a case-
by-case determination. 146
140. Haynes v. County of Missoula, 517 P.2d 370 (Mont. 1973).
141. Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (1981) (skydiving); Schlobohm v. SPA Petite,
Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. 1982) (health spa membership).
142. 148 Cal. App. 3d 1107, 196 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1983).
143. Id. at 1109, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
144. See supra text accompanying note 134.
145. Cregg, 148 Cal. App. at 1111, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
146. Courts in other jurisdictions which have adopted the Tunkl standards also
apply a balancing approach when less than all of the factors are present. For example,
in Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977), the Tennessee Supreme Court
stated, "We think these criteria are sound and we adopt them. It is not necessary that
all be present in any given transaction, but generally a transaction that has some of
these characteristics would be offensive." Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
Additionally, in Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981), the Colorado
Supreme Court used the Tunkl standards to find that "the duty to the public factor"
was not present. Id. at 376. Jones involved an exculpatory clause in a contract for the
use of skydiving facilities. Id. at 372. The court found that the use of the facility was
not a practical necessity for any member of the public, the operator of the facilities did
not possess superior bargaining power, and the contract was not one of adhesion. Id.
at 377-78. The court held that "[w]hile it is not necessary for a contract to embody all
of the characteristics set forth in Tunkl ... to meet the test, we conclude that an
insufficient number of the characteristics are present in the instant case to establish
that the contract ... affected the public interest." Id. at 377.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Burgess and Kuhn, Alaska courts applying the
public duty exception currently rely upon a two-part test in both ex-
culpatory and indemnity situations. Courts deem a clause that fulfills
this test unenforceable because it affects a public duty. It is, at this
point, very difficult to tell what, if any, impact the Locker opinion will
have on this analysis. There are three problems with the test as pres-
ently applied. First, the two-part test does not provide adequate gui-
dance in determining which factual situations call for the application
of the exception. Second, because of the very limited number of cases
in which the Alaska courts have applied the exception to this point,
courts may draw upon very little precedent in applying the exception.
Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a dis-
tinction between indemnity and exculpatory clauses.
The Alaska courts' adoption of standards similar to those used in
the California analysis of the public duty exception, and mentioned in
the narrow context of the Locker opinion, would provide a solution to
these problems. As this note has shown, the Tunkl six-part test and
the two-part test established in Burgess address the same concerns.
The Tunkl test, however, provides a more precise tool for predicting
when the public duty exception will apply. Accordingly, its adoption
would benefit courts, lawyers, and contracting parties.
Additionally, the case law implementing the Tunki standards
constitutes a valuable source of illustrations of the proper application
of the public duty exception. Because of the similarity between the
Alaska approach and the Tunki standards, Alaska courts may refer to
this case law even if the courts do not adopt the Tunkl standards
themselves. Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court should adopt the
view, adhered to in California, that courts should examine indemnity
clauses and exculpatory clauses under different standards. Adopting
an express distinction between the treatment of the two types of
clauses will create more predictability and facilitate more rational
analysis in these cases. In sum, California law on the public duty ex-
ception and the Tunkl standards, along with cases from other jurisdic-
tions applying those standards, provide an excellent source of
precedent and analysis for Alaska courts as they continue to apply the
exception in different situations.
Robert E. Harrington
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